

# Evaluating Public Policy within a Framework: The Case of Madrassa Reforms in General Zia Era (1977-1988)

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## Abstract

This study evaluates madrassa reforms policies introduced during General Zia-ul-Haq regime within a policy evaluation framework. Generally it is quite difficult to find whether any specific public policy has fallen short of achieving conceived goals. However, on the basis of some of the impacts enlisted for appraisal of any policy process by the National Audit Office of the UK, policies can be evaluated. According to the frame work, if policies result in poor quality public services, deliver little or no benefits, exclude a section of society from benefits, do not meet expectations of the stakeholders and bring in adverse social and/or environmental consequences, then policies are hardly regarded as successful policies. In fact during the Zia-ul-Haq era, the state-led projects of reforming madrassa under the umbrella of Islamization did not become productive for the madrassa students and graduates and at a broader level for the society. Only the state and few of the renowned figures of madrassas remained real beneficiaries of madrassa reforms. In the light of impacts of poor policy process enlisted by National Audit Office of the UK, the study concludes that the state-led madrassa reforms in General Zia era brought poor quality services, delivered very little services and that too for a limited section of society. Moreover, the policy of reforming madrassa in the addressed era brought adverse social consequences and henceforth did not meet expectations of all stakeholders specifically madrassa graduates and students.

**Keywords:** Public Policy, Madrassa Reforms, General Zia-ul-Haq, Islamization, Pakistan, *Ulamā*

## Introduction:

Policy process consists of various interlinked stages from policy initiation to formulation to implementation to policy appraisal.<sup>1</sup> The term 'policy' is central to the activities and operation of both state institutions as well as private organizations. In McConnell's (2010) view, "a policy fails if it does not achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve..."<sup>2</sup> It is quite difficult to exactly determine if a certain policy has really fallen short of achieving desired goals enunciated by its proponents. However, the National Audit Office of the UK has enlisted few of the significant and widespread impacts of poor policy making which may be helpful for appraisal of any public policy process. Some of these include:<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Joseph Wholey, *Evaluation and Effective Public Policy Management* (Boston: Little Brown, 1982).

<sup>2</sup> Alan McConnell, "Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas in-between," *Journal of Public Policy* 30, no. 30 (2010): 345-362.

<sup>3</sup> National Audit Office, *Modern Policy-Making: Ensuring Policies Deliver Value for Money*, (Great Britain: National Audit Office, 2001), 1.

- Poor quality public services;
- Little or no benefit delivered or not sustainable in the long term;
- Sections of society excluded from benefits.
- Users' expectations not met;
- Adverse social and/or environmental consequences;

This paper opts the above mentioned theoretical underpinning to evaluate the state-led madrassa reforms in General Zia-ul-Haq era in Pakistan.

### **Background of the Madrassa Reforms in Zia-ul-Haq Era:**

The intervention of army in politics has been a recurring practice in the history of Pakistan. Ayub Khan's military regime established a few years later after the inception of the state lasted for more than a decade. It was under military regime of Yahya Khan that Pakistan dismembered. Zia-ul-Haq also intervened in politics in 1977 dismissing a democratically elected government under extreme pressure from opposition alliance over rigging charges in the 1977's elections. The protests launched in the entire state against rigging later turned more violent and transformed into Tehrik-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa (a religious movement).<sup>4</sup> Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)—a Grand National alliance of the opposition parties leading the masses in protests largely drew its support from small towns, bazaar sector, mosques and other religious segments of society.<sup>5</sup> Taking advantage of the prevailing unrest across the state, General Zia-ul-Haq intervened in politics through coup d'état.

Paul Brooker is of the view that army intervenes in politics generally to achieve four major objectives. These include; corporate self-interest, national interests, individual self-interest and social self-interest. According to him, often the army intervenes in politics with a conceived purpose of safeguarding the national interest but goes well beyond to extent of ruling the state as a custodian of national interests<sup>6</sup> and Zia-ul-Haq's military rule was no exception to this. The study claims that General Zia-ul-Haq assuming the role of custodian of national interests took over the charge of the state and introduced Islamization program which also included madrassa reforms. However, the Islamization program served more for General Zia's personal interests of strengthening the regime rather than serving the national interests.

This study using scholarly work of Mumtaz Ahmad, Jamal Malik, Masooda Bano, Christine Fair, Qasim Zaman, Christopher Candland and Robert Looney makes an appraisal of the state-led madrassa reforms in Zia era in the light of a frame work for evaluation of public policy process designed by the National Audit Office of the UK. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two of the paper gives details of Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization program under which the reforms were introduced. The third section covers formulation and implementation stages of the state-led madrassa reform plans launched in Zia-ul-Haq era. The last section evaluates the state's policy of reforming madrassas in General Zia-ul-Haq era.

<sup>4</sup>Mughees Ahmed, "Political Role of Sunnis and their Factions in Pakistan," in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, et al. (eds.), *Political Role of Religious Communities in Pakistan* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2008), 41.

<sup>5</sup>Abdur Rehman, "Dynamism of Pakistan's Civil Society: Religious-Secular Rivalry and its Resources," *Journal of International Development and Cooperation* 12, no. 2(2006): 47-70.

<sup>6</sup>Paul Brooker, *Non-democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 73.

### **Islamization in General Zia Era:**

General Zia ul Haq soon after taking over charge of the government propelled the perception that un-Islamic trends prevailing in the country had reasonably led to anti-Bhutto agitation and justified them as a natural reaction of the citizens of the state achieved on formative ideology.

In this connection, General Zia disclosed his plans of introducing Islamization program for Pakistani society on September 1, 1977, in these words:

“A presidential form of government closest to Islamic ideology with president or ameer elected by the entire nation was best suited for Pakistan. The president will be checked by a legislature and shall be guided by the consensus of opinion “Ijma” in the “majlis-e-mushawarat”, the council of advisors consisting of the ulema possessing unimpeachable character. The president will be counterchecked by the prime minister and the prime minister by the National Assembly”.<sup>7</sup>

He often made pronouncements publicly in these words:

“...the ideology of Pakistan is Islam and only Islam. There should be no misunderstanding on this score. We should in all sincerity accept Islam as Pakistan's basic ideology ... otherwise ... this country (will) be exposed to secular ideologies”.<sup>8</sup>

So, apparently his Islamization program aimed eradication of un-Islamic trends from the society.

Under his Islamization Program, role of madaris, mosques and Islamic press were extended more roles in the society. His program was followed by establishment of many institutions such as Shariat Courts and Shariat Bill; state controlled system of collecting ushr and zakat, introducing religious laws and separate electorate for minorities.<sup>9</sup> Using momentum of Islamization programs General Zia won presidential elections getting 95% votes. The question for referendum was “whether the people of Pakistan wanted Islamic Shariah Law enforced in the country or not.” An affirmation of this question was counted as a vote in favor of Zia-ul-Haq to be the President of the state for the next five years.<sup>10</sup>

The Islamization program propounded by General Zia-ul-Haq affected many spheres of Pakistani society, including judicial, political, economic and education systems and culture and family laws.<sup>11</sup> In short, the state-led reforms under the banner of Islamization program were stretching over the entire state. Even the state itself took the responsibility of choosing the desired brand of Islam for the masses. Keeping in view the political and ideological requirements, the state in the beginning of the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq launched the religious career of Dr. Israr Ahmed-- a revivalist, broadcasting his programs on the state media, popularizing his brand of Islamic discourse but later seemed to be floating from revivalism to political consolidation as General Zia

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<sup>7</sup> Surendra Nath Kaushik, *Politics of Islamization in Pakistan, A Study of Zia Regime* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1993), 54.

<sup>8</sup> Claude Rakisits, “Center Province Relations in Pakistan under President Zia: The Government's and Opposition's Approaches,” *Pacific Affairs* 6, no. 11(1988): 79.

<sup>9</sup> Rehman, *Dynamism of Pakistan's Civil Society*.

<sup>10</sup> Rubina Saigol, “Class and Politics in the Radicalization of Pakistani State and Society,” In *Pakistan: Reality Denial and the Complexity of its State* (Berlin: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2009), 48,50.

<sup>11</sup> Vladimir N. Moscalenko, *Evolution of State and Political Structure and the Role of Islam in Pakistan and Bangladesh*. In A. Wink (ed.), *Islam, Politics and Society in South Asia* (New Delhi: Mahohar, 1991), 23.

replaced him with Tahir ul Qadri--a Bareilwi scholar, a non-politician advocating devotional and sufi-oriented Islam.<sup>12</sup> In the wake of Islamization program the state-led reforms were initiated in madrassas too, along with other developments.”<sup>13</sup>

The madrassa reforms brought in General Zia era were formulated in the light of the recommendations of two reports; Sargodha and Halepota Reports. These reports were concluded on the basis of surveys of madrassas of various areas and later were submitted to the government.

The details of the two reports are as follows:

#### **Sargodha Report:**

As soon as Islamization program was initiated, General Zia ul Haq met some of the ulama at Sargodha and sought their recommendations for efficient execution of his plans. The ulama demanded that in order to enhance the role of madrassa graduates in the society, madaris must be given autonomous status. Keeping their demands in view, General Zia-ul-Haq directed the Ministry of Religious Affairs to bring forward issues pertaining to madrassas through a survey. Following his directions, a report was submitted to the government which scratched out few of the economic issues confronting madrassa stakeholders. The report gave few recommendations for reforming madrassas such as modifying their curriculum, establishing standardized system of education, integrating formal education system with that of the madrassa education system and establishing University for Higher education or Ulama Academy.<sup>14</sup> Making Sargodha Report a model for survey, another survey was carried out in 1979. Based on this survey some recommendations for reforming madrassas were presented to government in a report known as Halepota Report.

#### **Halepota Report:**

The government set up the National Committee for Deeni Madaris (NCDM) under the headship of Dr. Halepota in 1979. The committee comprising of renowned religious scholars and educationists enlisted several problems facing madrassa stakeholders. Major among those highlighted problems in the report included unemployment of madrassa graduates, huge difference in pays of teachers of formal education system and madrassa teachers and lack of basic necessities of life in madrassas. According to the report, madrassas were in a dire need of their integration with the formal education system and introduction of few of the modern subjects in their curriculum was also necessary for making their roles more productive in the society. The NCDM suggested including Mathematics, Urdu, General Science and Social Science at the Primary level; Mathematics, Pakistan Studies, English and General Science at the Secondary level and two subjects from Economics, Political Science and English at the Graduate level. It was also recommended to increase the duration of Middle and Higher levels at madrassa with a purpose to give twice time to Darsi Nizami with that of subjects of formal education system. This approach largely aimed to prepare students to meet the challenges of the modern age and render services for Islam. For the Master level it was proposed to include Fiqha, Tafseer, Maqoolat and Hadith. In order to get master degree in

<sup>12</sup> Mumtaz Ahmad, “Media-Based Preachers and the Creation of New Muslim Publics in Pakistan,” in M. Ahmad, D. Reetz & T. Johnson (ed.), *Who Speaks for Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular Preachers in South Asia*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, no 22, 2000, 1-28.

<sup>13</sup> Maryam Siddiq, *Politics of Madrassa Reforms in Pakistan between Islamization and Enlightened Moderation* (Islamabad: IRD, IIU, 2016), 69, 70.

<sup>14</sup> Government of Pakistan, “Sargodha Report,” 1978.

any one of these, eight papers were proposed; four papers and a research paper from the relevant subject and three additional papers of Islamic Economy, Islam and Politics and History were made compulsory. Additionally, comparative religious sciences were to be offered as an optional subject.<sup>15</sup>

The proposed scheme of studies was proposed to be comprised of:

Darja *Ibtidāyah* (Primary), Darja Muatawisita (Matric), Darja *Āliyah* (B.A) and Darja Takhasūṣ (M.A). In the same scheme of studies *Tajwīd-o-Qirāat* was declared equivalent to the Middle Class.<sup>16</sup>

The Committee suggested to establish a National Institute for Deeni Madaris for holding responsibilities for conducting exams, announcing results and compiling and revising curricula where required in addition to playing some other suggested roles. The Committee brought in some other recommendations such as sending madrassa teachers abroad like that of Central Overseas Training Scheme and giving scholarship to Deeni Madaris students in order to enhance their performance.<sup>17</sup>

### **Implementation of Madrassa Reforms:**

The Deobandi and Barelwi schools of thought perceived the state-led madrassa reforms as a great threat to their predominance. The Deobandi Wafaq-ul-Madaris initially rejecting the proposals of National Committee for Deeni Madaris introduced their own modified curriculum in 1983. Following the footprints of Deobandis, Barelwis' Tanzeem-ul-Madaris also made alterations in their curriculum. Only the duration of scheme of studies i.e 16 years was opted from the proposals of National Committee for Deeni *Madāris*. Nevertheless, both Wafaq-ul-Madaris and Tanzeem-ul-Madaris rejected the recommendation of National Committee for Deeni Madaris to make sub-division of *Deenī Madāris* education into four levels similar to that of formal education system rather they preferred their own designed sub-division into six levels. Wafaq-ul-Madaris made very few modifications in Darsi Nizami curriculum but they were essentially different from those suggested in Halepota Report. Most of the proposals of Halepota Report remained heedless at the Primary level while addition of few subjects was made at the Secondary level as the classical Darsi Nizami subjects were added as part of madrassa curriculum towards the end of that level.<sup>18</sup>

Later, at Darjah-e-takmil, the wafaq added some new subjects such as Logic, Euclid Mathematics, Philosophy, Refutation of other Religions and Apostasy, Basics of Jurisprudence, Economics as well as Capitalism and Communism. Wafaq-ul-Madaris proposed two systems of education; one to eight was non-religious, completed by *Qur'ān* and Basics of Islam while second one was retained exactly in the manner as it was earlier i.e. Darsi Nizami. Tanzeem-ul-Madaris made addition of eight more years and retained their old curriculum as few of the modern subjects were listed but their contents largely remained unspecified and addition followed up to level 10.<sup>19</sup>

One can find that there was a huge contrast between the curriculums proposed by the National Committee of Deeni Madaris and modified curriculum of *Wafāq* and

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<sup>15</sup>Government of Pakistan, "Halepota Report," 1979.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Jamal Malik, *Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books), 169-173, 139-151.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

Tanzeem. The syllabus proposed by NCDM gave central place to classical and modern subjects while Wafaq and Tanzeem retained dominance of Islamic law in their final version of syllabus. According to the new scheme, the subjects like Comparative Religious Sciences, Economics, Communism and Capitalism and Social Sciences and other subjects were offered as optional subjects while subjects like General Science, Pakistan Studies and English were not considered at all. Later some modifications in curriculum were adopted by Wafaq and Tanzeem after several interactions with the government but even then their syllabus remained quite different from that suggested by NCDM.

#### **Settlement of Madrassas' Academic Affairs:**

On the implementation stage of madrasa reform policy, Zia government showed a great flexibility and declared madrasa degrees at a par with the degrees of formal education system without making any innovation or a major shift in their curriculum. Even, the medium of instruction was not changed. The implementation stage of the reforms followed the settlement of few major issues including equivalence of madrasa degrees. The proposals of the University Grant Commission (UGC) for the equivalence were implemented on April 6, 1981. According to the notification, universities were supposed to recognize Fawqaniyyah certificate of Arabic and Islamiyat conditionally as the graduates were bound to pass two more subjects of formal education system compulsory for B.A examinations. At the later stages, a notification released on November 17, 1982, by the University Grant Commission depicted that equivalency of M.A Islamiyat and Arabic would be given to the Shahadat-ul-Faragha of Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Bareilly, the Sahadat-ul-Fazila Sanad of Wafaq-ul-Madaris Deoband, Al-shahadat-ul-Alia, the final sanad of *Ahl-al-Hadith* and Sultan-ul Afazil, the final certificates of Shia. It was assured that the madrasa graduates could use the aforementioned degrees for getting admission at higher level relevant to these specific subjects and for teaching of Arabic and Islamiyat at the College and University levels. However, if Deeni Madaris students sought to adopt any professions other than teaching of Arabic and Islamic Studies, they were supposed to pass two more subjects other than Arabic, Persian, Islamic Studies and Urdu. In order to create uniformity, the final certificate was titled as Shahadah-ul-Alamiya Min Uloom il Islamia which was decided to be given after 16 years of education.<sup>20</sup>

In addition five Jamias were also treated as wafaqs as they were given authority to issue their own degree certificates recognized by the government. The five Jamias included Darul Uloom Korongi K-Area (Karachi), Jamia Ashrafia, Feroz Pur Road (Lahore), Darul Uloom Mohammadia Ghousia, Behra Sharif (Sargodha), Jamia Taleemat-e-Islamia (Faisalabad) and Jamia Islamia *Minhaj-ul-Qur'an* (Lahore). The prominent ulama heading those Jamias within the religious hierarchy managed to secure the Jamias' special status.<sup>21</sup>

#### **Settlement of Madrassas' Financial Affairs:**

In order to settle financial affairs of madrassas, the state-led Zakat system was introduced through Zakat and Usher Ordinance on June 20, 1980. Under the Ordinance, the state was held responsible of Zakat imposition and collection rather than the

<sup>20</sup> Masooda Bano, *Contesting Ideologies and Struggle for Authority: State-Madrasa Engagement in Pakistan*, Working Paper 17 (University of Birmingham: International Development Department, 2007), 23.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

individuals. The Ordinance assigned madrassas to give away Zakat to the needy and poor students of DM, nevertheless, the madrassas as institutions were not entitled to receive Zakat.

On the initial stages it was decided that Provincial Zakat Councils would provide financial assistance to 100 Deeni Madaris of all sects. The financial assistance was provided to DM conditionally as they had to register as a society and they were also supposed to be accountable for right usage of funds. "The Central Zakat Council distributed funds to the Provincial Zakat Councils and according to the Zakat Regulation, Zakat funds could just be utilized for the sustenance of students, remuneration of the teachers and thus should serve to keep the DM functioning."<sup>22</sup> In order to disburse Zakat money, the ulama committee in the beginning laid down three categories which were later extended to five when it ought to increase amount for disbursement. Later, it was decided to further extend sub-division of the Provincial Zakat Council to 10 with a purpose of improving Zakat disbursement process. To ascertain other conditions regarding Zakat fund, the provincial Zakat administration nominated a 12 members committee to finalize other concerned details. "The proportion of funds disbursed to DM out of Zakat funds passed on to the provinces by the Central Zakat Council from 1981 to 1985 was 1.9, 4.4, 5.2, 3.1 and 9.4 respectively."<sup>23</sup>

#### **Outcomes and Implications of madrassa-reform efforts in Zia Era:**

This section makes an appraisal of the policy making process towards madrassa in Zia era in the light of significant and widespread impacts of poor policy making as outlined by the National Audit Office of the UK.

#### **Poor quality public services:**

Flawed public policy brings poor quality public services. General Zia's madrassa reform policies brought some poor quality of services to public on a large scale. For instance, focusing much on the madrassa system, public sector education was solely ignored. The money allocated for the public sector education was far lesser than half of the defense budget.<sup>24</sup> Consequently, failure of the public sector to expand its education network affordable for the poverty-stricken segment of society led to increase in madrassa enrollment. Madrassas came up as affordable alternative source of education for poor as madrassa administration relied more on foreign funding as well zakat received domestically under the reform plans rather than getting fees from the students like that of formal education system. Moreover, without making any major shift in curriculum, their degrees were recognized at all levels of the formal education system. So, their planned expansion assisted by the state through reforms resulted in increasing madrassa number as well as enrollment. However, the reforms did not fulfill the demands of the market as madrassa produced a bulk of graduates with scant intellectual capital and skills demanded by the labour market. As a consequence they imposed a threatening economic challenge to Pakistan.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Siddiqi, *Politics of Madrassa Reforms*, 81.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military INC* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 163.

<sup>25</sup> C. Christine Fair, "Islam and Politics in Pakistan," in Rabasa, A. (ed.), *The Muslim World after 9/11* (US: Rand Corporation, 2004), 277.

### Sections of society excluded from benefits:

In a poor public policy few sections of society are excluded from getting benefits. The implementation of madrassa reforms provided political support from the madrassa sector to the military regime and in return General Zia extended some more concessions to them. These favours tilted the equilibrium between religious and secular segment of society in favor of the former. Resultantly, a wide gap between the two segments generated which led to fragmentation of the society and nourished intolerance and violence across the state. This fragmentation of society turned more noticeable as during General Zia era various human rights organizations and the labour and student unions were banned considering them pro-Bhutto and independent writers, press, thinkers and poets were “subject to political prosecution” while the Islami-Jamiat-e-Taliba backed by Jammat-i-Islami and other such groups were left unchecked by the state. Briefly, Islamic groups of the society were encouraged by the state at the cost of secular, liberals and modern sectors.<sup>26</sup>

Not only the secular segment of the society suffered as a result of the state-led madrassa reforms rather some of the madrassa stakeholders were also excluded from the benefits. In Pakistan, madrassas provide food, lodging and education to the orphans and deprived children who are a large segment of the society.<sup>27</sup> In the state-led madrassa reforms launched in General Zia era, nothing was suggested for the good nutrition of the students who were bound to spend much time in madrassas. So, it can be concluded that students were excluded from getting benefits.

### Users’ expectations not met:

In a poor public policy users’ expectations are not met. The state-led madrassa reforms policy in Zia era did not meet the expectations of the madrassa graduates and students. No doubt madrassa enrollment enhanced as soon as their degrees were declared at a par with the formal system of education. A perception was created widely that madaris reforms would provide graduates employment and opportunities for participation in various affairs of life. But contrary to expectations, very few renowned figures of madrassas including Maulana Taqi Usmani of Karachi, Pir Karam Shah of Sargodha and Maulana Sami-ul-Haq of Akora Khattak and others of their associates were appointed as, judges in Federal Shariat Court members of Councils of Islamic Ideology and many other newly created Islamic commissions, committees and institutions during General Zia era.<sup>28</sup> A huge number of madrassa graduates was unaware of their new perceived role if existed in the light of some developments under Islamization. In reality unemployment of madrassa became quite noticeable in the entire state and madrassa graduates in the state were left with no opportunities except to participate in Afghan Jihad against the USSR. In order to overcome extreme unemployment of the madrassa graduates, some 12, 000 mosque schools were opened by Zia government in 1983-84. Those mosque schools were supposed to teach expanded curriculum introducing modern scientific disciplines.<sup>29</sup> But, that too did not produce the expected outcomes as unemployment of madrassa graduates did not decline.

<sup>26</sup> Rehman, Dynamism of Pakistan’s civil society.

<sup>27</sup> Tahir Mehmood Butt, Social and Political Role of Madrassa: Perspectives of Religious Leaders in Pakistan, *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* 27, no. 2 (2012, July-December): 395.

<sup>28</sup> Mumtaz Ahmad, “Madrassa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh,” in Satu P. Limayeet Ed., *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia* (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), 101-116.

<sup>29</sup> Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1999), 279.



**Adverse social and/or environmental consequences:**

Adverse social consequences are among notable impacts of poor policy process framed by the National Audit Office of the UK. Some of the adverse social consequences came up as a result of madrassa reforms in General Zia regime as under:

Firstly, madrassa started producing a huge number of scholars who were absolutely ignorant of their roles in the light of new developments. They were solely unskilled and could perform some limited activities productive enough for the development of society. In the aftermath of this development, when the unemployment for madrassa graduates became a challenging issue in the society, the government initiated some measures to abridge the space of knowledge as well as linguistics between students of formal education system and madrassa students. The purpose behind the entire government-led measures was to create more employment opportunities for madrassa graduates.<sup>30</sup> In this connection, English medium schools were instructed by the government to make a shift to Urdu medium or any of state recognized regional languages. Similarly, Arabic being a language of Islam was declared as compulsory foreign language and later on as medium of instruction in all government schools from class 1. It was decided that English would be introduced at level 6 in all government schools. These adjustments as a step towards series of efforts initiated by government to accommodate madrassa graduates in fact led to pedagogical, cultural, and political problems in the country.<sup>31</sup>

Secondly, madrassa reforms in General Zia era led to stimulation of sectarianism. For instance, during General Zia regime there was a perception that Deoband maslak got state patronage and appointments of Deobandis in various state institutions including army kahtibs largely aimed to promote Deoband version of Islam. Moreover, Deoband ulama were given notable representation in Parliament. Auqaf department was also used to give more advantage to Deoband ulama. Activities of some of the anti-shia organization Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad, the parent of Lashkar-e-Tayaba and Al-Rashid Trust were promoted in the entire state.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a radical Deoband figure founded Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) to counter Shias' influence in Pakistan. The group started combating shias at all levels with an aim to promote Deobandi version of Islam. The group invoked resentment among Shias by propagating stance that Shias must be declared non-Muslims same as Ahmedis. The group besides participating in to mainstream national politics also formed an armed wing Lashkar-e-Jhagvi, whose cadres strove for achieving sectarian goals in Pakistan on one hand and participated in Afghan jihad the other hand.<sup>33</sup>

The Shia community also harboured resentment over some state-led developments such as imposition of Deoband version of Islam at state level which also included state-led zakat process. According to them these steps were damaging the interests of Shias. The shia community re-organized their own group Tehrik-e-Nifaz-i-Fiq-i-Jafriya (1979) with a conceived purpose of curtailing anti-shia activities of Deobandis.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Kepel, Gilles, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 104.

<sup>31</sup> Naz Rassool and Sabiha Mansoor, (eds), *Global Issues in Language, Education and Development in Pakistan* (UK: Multilingual Matters, 2007), 227. Retrieved from: [http://pk.boell.org/sites/default/files/endf\\_pakistan\\_engl.pdf](http://pk.boell.org/sites/default/files/endf_pakistan_engl.pdf)

<sup>32</sup> International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: Madrassa, Extremism and the Military*. Asia Report No 36, (Islamabad/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July, 2002).

<sup>33</sup> Marium Mufti, *Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Literature Review* (Washington D.C: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 38-40.

<sup>34</sup> Frederic Grare, "The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever Changing Face of Islamic Violence," *Journal of South Asian Studies* 30, no. 1 (2007): 127-143.

Moreover, a huge amount of money was distributed under reforms which led to an official competition for state patronage among all sects and subsects. The madrassa-based groups expanded their activities from forming political parties to raising jihadi militias and even becoming a part of government.<sup>35</sup> In short, “an unhealthy competition between madrassas of different sects started which imperiled the peace of the society by upholding militancy and sectarianism.”

Thirdly, the above mentioned activities diverted the focus of students as well as madrassa administration from attaining and imparting education in its real sense to seeking material benefits from domestic as well as global actors by politicizing madrassas. For instance, madrassa of all sects such as Anjuman Tulab-i-Islam and Jamiyat Tulabi-i-Islam, Barelwi’s backed Jamiyat Ulema-i-Pakistan and the wings of Deobandi backed Jamiyat Ulama-i-Islam and Sipa-i-Muhammad –a Shia activist group and Imamiya Students Organization—a Shia Youth group recruited workers for student organizations to achieve political interests at the domestic as well as global levels.<sup>36</sup>

Fourthly, levying of zakat tax provided more opportunities to state to interfere in madrassas internal affairs. The government obliged few madrassa administration by generously disbursing zakat money among them while zakat money was withheld for regimes’ opponents such as madrassas led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman. The state continued providing money to Barelwis, Jammah-i-Islami and Ahle-e-Hadith madrassas to secure regime’s political interests by suppressing liberal and opposition forces.<sup>37</sup>

### Conclusions:

The study finds that the state failed to define or elucidate real interests of madrassa stakeholders particularly students and graduates in General Zia era. Using the framework for impacts of a flawed public policy process as outlined by National Account Office of the UK, the study concludes that the state-led madrassa reforms in Zia era did not come up to the expectations of all stakeholders rather delivered very little services for a limited section of society which in fact brought adverse social consequences. In this connection the study also draws conclusion that the state-led madrassa reforms in the addressed era anchored the roots of some multifaceted problems (militancy, violence and sectarianism) in the society which kept on multiplying simultaneously and are existed as major threats to the very existence of the state even in the contemporary era. The study argued that the armed culture to which the Pakistani society was unfamiliar prior to 1980 was promoted in General Zia era as notable number of madrassa graduates and students were trained under the state patronage to wage jihad in Afghanistan against the Russian forces. Briefly, the state-led madrassa reforms during General Zia era promoted and protected political interests of the regime.

<sup>35</sup> Religious parties such as JUP, JI and Anjuman Sipah Sahaba Party (ASSP) got more benefits on the domestic level which proved to be quite fatal for the society and the state. For detail see, Mehtab Ali Shah, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1971–1994* (London: I B Tauris, 1997), 138-140; Haroon K Ullah, *Vying for Allah’s Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence and Extremism in Pakistan* (US: Georgetown University, 2013).

<sup>36</sup> Mumtaz Ahmad, “Continuity and Change in Traditional System of Islamic Education: The Case of Pakistan,” in C. Kennedy and C. Baxter (ed.), *Pakistan 2000* (pp. 129-139) (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2001), 137, 138, 111, 112.

<sup>37</sup> Malik, 1999, 151.