

A Critical Analysis of Civil Military Relations in Islamic World

*Ramzan Shahid

**Shumaila Rafique

***Arshad Munir

Abstract

The Islamic world is more democratic after 1980s because of disruption of many authoritarian regimes in the world and the probe about the role of army in government is diminishing from academic schema. But in the 1950s and in 1960s this was a serious agenda for scholars, especially in developing countries. According to Samuel Huntington, the increased professionalization of military leads to disengagement of military from politics. Social order with more stable civil military relations has countless benefits in the exploration of security. But this is problematic when it applied to Islamic World. The two core modes of government normally followed are complete military control over the government or absolute civilian control over the armed forces. There is huge cycle of circumstances of military intervention and withdrawal in major Islamic countries like Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and Arab World. These countries have remained under direct or indirect military rule during the past. Egypt is still under direct army rule and Türkiye is continuously heading towards civil supremacy. There is a lack of power sharing formulas and a mediate approach. In our study we will analyze the existing formulas of civil-Military relations in the Muslim countries around the World.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, Politics, Power, Policy, Security, Egypt, Türkiye.

Introduction:

Islam originated in early seventh century CE in the Arabian Peninsula, in Makkah under the prophethood of Hazrat Muhammad (PBUH) who was also the first supreme leader and ruler of Islamic state. He either participated in battles as a chief of army staff or appointed someone as chief commander in the war to fight against the enemies. The Holy Quran says “And prepare for them whatever power and whatever garrisoned horses you can, to (spread) awe thereby into (the hearts) of the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others, apart from them (i.e., besides them) that you do not know; Allah knows them. And whatever you expend in the way of Allah will be repaid you in full, and you will not be done an injustice”¹

Islam is religion of peace, but it always emphasized its followers to beware about robust defense system in order to counter any belligerent. It was due to these commandments that companions of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) were not only good traders and professionals in other walks of life but were also stern warriors. Due to a strong defense system, it became possible for the Muslims to survive in the early days of Islam. As a Head of state, The Holy Prophet (PBUH) himself used to direct his Army time to time related to war

*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Gujrat, Gujrat.

**Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Gujrat, Gujrat.

*** Chairperson, Department of Islamic Studies, University of Gujrat, Gujrat.

¹ *Al-Qur’ān, Al-Anfal: 60*

strategies.² However, there was no regular system of Military in the beginning of Islam. It was initiated and regularized by Hazrat Umar Farooq (RA) in fifteen Hijra.³ During this early period of Islam, the Caliphate was not only the civilian head of state but the head of military as well. There was no concept of Civil-Military relations as there was no concept of separation of powers. Upon the orders of caliphate Hazrat Umar, the chief of Islamic military Hazrat Khalid bin Walid was suspended from command and there was no misperception generated by this move. Islam urges its followers to obey the people who have appointed as rulers among them.⁴ So, civil-military relations have never been a problem in caliphate periods. But with the advent of the modern nation state system and adoption of democracy as system of Government by the many Muslim countries, civil-military relations have become an essential matter to be deliberated. Modern nation-state system is contrary to the concept of *Ummah* so there is no specific line of thought about civil-military relations among the Muslim scholars; rather presented in broad view of community specific relationship. We are introduced with this specific term in the writings of modern thinkers who have a pro-democratic approach.

The perfect definition of civil military relations (CMR) is the relationship of political power of a particular government or society and its fighting power (army). The word “civil” means any civil government in which military is included so in accordance with this view of word civil means ‘civil government is superior to military’. Although the military is an important institution of any country but as far as politics and civilian departments are concerned the military is far from them. But in the case of developing countries military is indulged in politics for many epochs. “Civil-Military Relations are one aspect of National Security policy. The aim of the National Security policy is to enhance the safety of nation’s social, economic and political institutions against threats arising from other independent states. Civil Military Relations are the principal institutions component of military security policy”.⁵

The first theory is among one of the popular theories given by Samuel P. Huntington (1927-2008); who was an influential political scientist. He was most popular for his theory of “Clash of civilization” in 1993. Samuel P. Huntington, in his original book on CMR 1957 “Soldier and State”, described differences between two worlds e.g. civil authorities and Military authorities. He considers that military values and norms are mostly conservative and norms by civilian authorities are mostly liberals. Both worlds consist of their own unique norms and values. The military functions are totally different from civilians. He focused on “Military professionalism”. Huntington claims that civilian leadership would decide the object for military and then leave it in the military to achieve objects or goals. Here he described two problems:

- (1) Too much control over the military could result in disaster on the battleground.
- (2) Less control mechanism over military would generate the opportunity of an overthrow (i.e.) disappointment of civilian administration.

² Rafiullah Muhammad Mufti, “Sipah Saalar e Azam,” *Fikro Nazr*, 12, no. 10, (1975): 674-684.

³ Al-Balādhūrī Aḥmad bin Yaḥyā, *Kitāb Futūḥ al-buldān*, (Beirut: Moassat ul Maaraf, 1987), 248.

⁴ *Al-Qur’ān, An-Nisa*:59.

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *Solider and State*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 97.

To solve these two problems Huntington's solution is "Objective Civilian Control". Directions would be more intrusive and detailed to put it simply "The more objective civilian control, the more military security".

Huntington identified two shaping forces for civilian control. The first force is functional, and the second one is societal. He broke the societal force into two categories: ideology and structure. By ideology it means world view and by structure it means legal constitutional framework that guided political affairs generally and military affairs specially.⁶

⁷ He stalwartly considers that unsurpassed civil military relations should be within the objective civilian control over their armed forces. This control is specified by the following factors:

- (1) The military's adoption of professional ethos.
- (2) Effective subordination of military to civilian political leaders.
- (3) All approvals and recognitions from political leaders.
- (4) Minimal intervention of army in politics and politicians in military affairs.

Janowitz claims that there is insufficient study in developing countries about the relationship of civilian institutions with military. The key difficulty is to maintain the equilibrium between sustained military force sufficient to protect as well as tolerate democratic ethics of the political culture and government control to be enough to evade any intervention from military in civilian institutions. He agreed with Samuel P. Huntington that separate civilian and military worlds would happen but he disagree with unmatched solution for ending threat for the democratic government. This theory assumed that there should be militarization of military or civilianization of military.⁸ He assumed that army would recollect the various important dissimilarities from the government which would continue noticeably.⁹ He also holds the account of Huntington that due to basic variations army and government clatter with each other on certain issues which would reduce the effective civilian control of the army. In sum, Janowitz claims that despite all this, the military would hold on some differences from civilian institutions just because of its identification as military in nature.¹⁰ Apart from Huntington and Janowitz there are many other academics who are working on CMR. There are two more models to understand civil military relations as, concordance theory and institutional and occupational theory. The last one is a hypothesis of Charles Mosko that means accordance with institutional model military is much far from civilian

⁶ Ibid, 103.

⁷ Feaver, Peter D. "An American Crisis in Civilian Control and Civil Military Relations." *The Tocqueville Review*, n.d.

⁸ Irving Louis Horowitz, *The War Game* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963), 73.

⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 154.

¹⁰ Ibid., 178.

department and according to occupational hypothesis military is much more concur or rally on civilian department. According to Mosko military is not entirely separate from society.¹¹

Rebecca L. Schiff provides a different kind of theory because all other theories of CMR mostly rely on separation of military and political world. Schiff holds that military and civilian world must detached both in terms of physical and in ideological term.¹² In simple words Schiff's focus is only on effective cooperation between these two. She suggests that this kind of cooperation should occur between three classes of state such as:

- (1) The Military
- (2) The Political elite
- (3) The citizens of the state

According to Schiff, these three classes must aim for cooperation on four conditions:

- (1) Community Arrangements for the Officers
- (2) The Process of Civilian Decision making
- (3) The Process of Appointment of military
- (4) The Grace of the Army

Schiff holds that there is less chances of intervention of military in domestic politics if agreement occurs in these three classes based on four unique indicators. There are many levels of military intervention in politics i.e. Lobbying, Replacement, Direct action and black mailing.

1. Lobbying is the process of influencing the decisions of government officials. Lobbying is done by all types of people, including individual, different sectors, corporations, government officials and by many interest groups. There are different forms of lobbying. Lobbying is the first among the level of military intervention; through this a group of people works on a particular agenda (involving military in politics) and they use different means to reach their goals.
2. The second level of military intervention is replacement; civilian government replaced by military in crucial circumstances. The civilian government does not work properly and especially in Third World countries army got a chance to rule the country just because of civilian deficiencies.
3. The third among the levels of military intervention is direct action. Sometimes the army overthrew the civilian government and holds control of the country by announcing Martial Law.
4. The fourth level of military intervention is blackmailing. The military threatens the civilian government to take off their government. These threats are always unjustified to gain their own goals.

¹¹ Charles C. Moskos, "From Institutional to Occupational: Trends in Military Organization," *Armed Forces and Society* 4, no. 1 (1977): 78.

¹² Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Routledge, n.d.).

According to Huntington military must follow the term “professionalism” as he defined this as cooperation. He believes that the army should not affect society, especially its transformations, army should only concern with its true duty of security of the country. As he said: “Military stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state”.¹³

In simple words, the more professional military, the more they accept civilian control. In contrast to the view of Huntington, Janowitz claims that professionalism inspires the aptitude and inclination to interfere in government. He considers professionalism as a vigorous process.¹⁴ Welch holds that leadership is most significant in influential attainment and upkeep the government control of the army.¹⁵

Types of Military Regimes:

Finer classifies three different military regimes ranging from direct to indirect intervention in societal affairs.¹⁶

- (1) The style of military withdrawal
- (2) The length of withdrawal of military
- (3) The possibility of re-intervention

The Arbitrator Military Regime:

This type of military regime intervenes when it feels the need to remove hurdles facing by civilian governments and withdraw from politics soon after completing the goal. This kind of intervention is very short. Military easily goes “back to barracks”. These types of military regimes believe in the government’s ability to run the state.¹⁷

The Ruler Type of Military Regime:

These types of military regime join the new idea of competence in the profession. This contains the different role of the militaries and holds the role of army as an advocate of effective political and social change. These kinds of governments permit the military to get share in the government. In this case the military withdraws only in the case of reinstating civilian government.¹⁸

¹³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 110.

¹⁴ Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations," *Armed Forces & Society* 3, no. 2 (1977): 56.

¹⁵ Claude Welch, *Two Strategies of Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Case Studies from Developing Countries* (Albany: University of New York Press, 1976), 34.

¹⁶ Samuel Edward Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Transaction Publishers, 1962), 98.

¹⁷ Talukder Manuiruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), 77.

¹⁸ Ibid., 133.

In fact, military intervention in politics or military withdrawal does not happen in a vacuum. It means there is always a political force working in society, as a coup d'états happen only when the civilian government cannot stop social disorders and military intervene because of this disorder of society by believe that it's national duty. In a few cases civilians organized against the military and forced them to go into their barracks e.g. Southern and Mediterranean Europe.¹⁹ Even some claims that associate military regimes with economic growth did not find strong support for the military as the cause of development.²⁰ Many countries provided significant examples for military involvement. The Arab world also provides a best example in this sense.

Creation of New States and Structure of the Army:

The creation of new states and the structure of the army were constructed on middle class, who made the decision to join army as they want to upgrade their own status from all the strata and ethnic groups. During the colonial period, the upper military class came from an autarchy class that was interlinked with a specific system.²¹ The policies for recruitment of army officers were changed during development period. For example, the sons of government employees and farmers who had just finished high school were able to join academies. However, this supremacy of the exceptional minorities could not still entirely change.²²

Military after Independence:

After independence the military had three characteristics:

Professionalism:

The impeccable situation for growth, development and numerous representations of the state is to reach all sectors of society. During this timeframe many Arab countries were indulge in wars internally or externally and this process enhanced the role of military. Even some scholars hold that military intervene in politics because of that role which it played in wars.²³ But the actual reason behind military intervention is excessive attention to military by public and state e.g. In Arab countries more than 50% of the budget is only for military. Even the military became the very first organization to use "modern technology". This convinced the public to view the military as the technological organization of state.²⁴ Another reason is the military is also seen as a advance institution because of the benefits and satisfaction it provided to its members such as health insurance, promotions, work compensation etc.

¹⁹ Claude Welch, *Two Strategies of Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Case Studies from Developing Countries* (Albany: University of New York Press, 1976), 63.

²⁰ R. D. McKinlay, "The Economic Performance of Military Regimes: A Cross-National Aggregate Study," *British Journal of Political Science* 6, no. 3 (1976): 291-310.

²¹ Gordon Torrey, *The Role of the Military in Society and Government in Syria and the Formation of U.A.R.* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963), 189.

²² Beer, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York: 1970).

²³ Faud Alkhurri, *The Military and the Ruling in Arab Countries* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), 78.

²⁴ P. J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921-1957* (London: Cass, 1967), 44.

Capability:

The military had the ability to change and reform the social system. Even it had that ability which can change the political system as well as many institutions. The military is part of the social system; its capability of changing society is linked to the conditions in other departments in society.

Disengagement:

This characteristic of military after independence depends upon disengagement from direct rule from politics. After military dominance of political process during the 1950s and 1960s, the military started restricting its area and became only a branch of government.²⁵ This subordination of military to civilians should not be confused with a transition to democracy. The fact is that the failure of military regime does not surely mean a transition to democracy, because there are examples where the former is not followed by the latter and one coup d'état may only change the ideological orientation of the regime does not end it.²⁶ The histories of Iraq, Syria and Egypt express about this. The conceptual explanation for the withdrawal from politics is based on the attributes of military institution, or the attributes of domestic, regional, or international environment. The military organizational attributes are based on progress within the institution and environmental attributes deal with social, political and state economy. The withdrawal of military from politics is not an easy process in any means. It depends on different kinds of variables; therefore, different variables give different kinds of paradigms either to share the power with civilians or fully enjoy it. When the military re-intervene in politics the process of withdrawal is more and more complex. The Arab world provides many outstanding case studies of military intervention. The unique culture of Arab countries provides different association of military with civilian departments and their relationship went through different stages. In many Arab countries still military officers govern, assist, intervene, withdrawal and re-intervene in politics. In short, many times military governments were not able to achieve what they hoped for but they come to an end.

Civil Military Relations in Muslim World

Arab World:

In the contemporary Arab World, the military relationships with society travel over three stages.

- (1) The neophyte stages of colonial powers which continued even after independence the effects of which are still present.
- (2) The progressive stage in which military plays its role in different kinds of developments e.g. national and economic.²⁷

²⁵ Claude Welch, *Two Strategies of Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Case Studies from Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 147.

²⁶ Juan Linz, "Transition to Democracy," *The Washington Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (1990): 45–67.

²⁷ Faud Alkhurri, *The Military and the Ruling in Arab Countries* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), 221.

- (3) The third stage is about withdrawal of military from direct role in matters of government; where military decreases its role in economic and social spheres of the government.²⁸

These three stages are not fixed or stable, but their components are connected, which makes the time period for every stage. According to Janowitz, the colonial powers hold that the minorities would better serve their interests rather than the majorities who refused their presence.²⁹ Based on this, the military became more capable of influencing the society compared to the Ottoman's rule. This interaction made the military professional organization (an ideal system for development). These two typical qualities are still present as the image of military.³⁰

Civil Military Relations in Egypt:

The modern state of Egypt introduced the existence of national identity. In 19th century, state of Egypt was based upon military and bureaucracy which further gave birth to Egyptian's nationalism in which the military declared it as the supporter through a conflicting position. On the one hand military of Egypt praised the Egyptian nation and hold that military wanted to take the responsibility of welfare and on the other hand military disrespects the civilians in term of their ability to govern. In 1950s, military took over the political scene and Nasser's socialist projects widen the "National accountability" for social justice. During Sadat's government the threat of war declined after 1979 Peace treaty with Israel and process of economic development brought a major change in the country. Sadat decreased the military spending which encouraged the military officers to expand their economic activities. The neoliberal (Involving to or representing a modified kind of Liberalism supporting free market Capitalism) reforms of Mubarak brought a major decline to supremacy of bureaucracy in 1990s. The structural and legal reforms were introduced for the betterment of the institutions. Many businessmen allied themselves with government even some retired army officers were appointed on top managerial posts after the emergence of private sector and privatized state-owned enterprises.

During the 1990s, the military acted as a more responsible institution of the state. As a result, the Egypt's military has two working modes:

- (1) Stability Mode
- (2) Crisis Mode

In stability mode military defends its own interests and in crisis mode the defense of State is the priority of military.

²⁸ Mark Cooper, "The Demilitarization of the Egyptian Orbit," *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 18, no. 2 (1982): 203–225.

²⁹ Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 111.

³⁰ Faud Alkhurri, *The Military and the Ruling in Arab Countries* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), 242.

The military began to sideline by the government of the president Sadat and Mubarak who were controlling the government and political process from 1952- 1970. The military monopolized power by the combination of social, economic and political conditions. Even the leaders of the military saw themselves as the only capable of saving the state as well as setting it on the right path.³¹ Sadat's accession to the presidency in 1970 brought a complete change in the Egyptian regime. Sadat's lack of charisma in comparison to Nasser and his unhealthy relations with the old guards of Nasser's regime made him realize that he could not meaningfully govern until he sidelined his enemies within the military. In 1971 he removed people from military top brass and then he controlled the new regime in accordance with his own interests. The strategy of Sadat is to appoint an apolitical general which will help in subordination of military to civilians. It also resulted in a more professional military which is only dedicated to external defense.

Whereas his Successor President Mubarak focused on the stability of the institutions and this kind of stability is only possible by increasing the professionalism in military department. Through this, the military assumed more social and economic functions in society.³² At the same time, he restricted the influential role of officer corps from political decisions. The Egyptian military also accepted this restriction. This is because of the declining the direct role of military and especially officer corps, in the Egyptian cabinet and the military presence that remained in the cabinet was rotated.³³

The military controls Egyptian's politics which is hampering Egypt's transition to democracy. There are many challenges in the political system of Egypt but the most important is imbalance between civil military relations. The military has controlled politics of Egypt from 1950s when colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the monarchy. In summer 2012 there were some short-lived hopes of supremacy of civilians but with the revolution of 2011 which seemed to have failed to uproot the military dominance by delaying the process of transition to democracy. Since the displacement of the President Mubarak in 2011, the politicians of the country failed to warrant civilian supremacy. The withdrawal of military from the Political Spheres has become a dream in the country but for the long-term process of democratization of the country it is important to trade down the military.

The Interests of Egypt's Military:

Whenever and wherever the military is in politics, they try to defend their own various interests. The most important interest is its defense expenditure. The other includes control over military size, gaining of armaments and some sort of control over economic

³¹ Imad Harb, "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation," *Middle East Journal* 57, no. 2 (2003): 98–112.

³² Stephan Gotowicki, *The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997), 56.

³³ Mark N. Cooper, "The Demilitarization of the Egyptian Orbit," *Middle Eastern Studies* 18, no. 2 (1982): 203–225.

resources. These interests were undercut in the regime of Mubarak. The recruitment decreased, and military depends upon US aid.

How the military defends its interests:

First is de facto political veto power that stops the risks of war and shortage of arms.

Second is by preserving enough economic independence by not exposing the military industrial sector to privatization.

The military's feeling of compulsion for the state also causes it to control the widening social inequalities. During the last years of Mubarak, the military distanced itself from ruling party NDP (National Democratic Party) stepping in to fill the vacuum by the government's retreat from some services. The military holds commanding power and is never exposed to legislative authorities. This kind of lack of transparency allows for wide speculation over the size of military's economic interests which lies between 10-40% of GDP. Revenues generated by many government-owned enterprises and then returned to military's accounts with no civilian proof. However, at certain points, Egypt stands among the lowest ranking in term of transparency at international level.³⁴

At the times of crisis military of Egypt focused on protection of state as well as state's survival. Egyptian state is a symbol of independence but according to the Egyptian military, sovereignty lies within the ranks rather than within society. This mode of governance of military shows the perception of military that is working from the topmost adversary to the well-being of society. This monopoly was jeopardizing in 2011 uprising as "civilians" were persuaded into the state as a powerful actor. When the public demanded the dismissal of Mubarak with massive anger then the army distanced itself from its supreme commander and demanded Mubarak's step down as he became a major threat for the state. In 2013, when the military removed from the office then President Morsi was in same circumstances as military was earlier in same condition. In 2011, the Egypt revolution put military in crisis mode. Mubarak's disposition created trouble for the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. In Egypt the power of the departments of a state destructed by neoliberal reforms and further increased the destruction by revolution of 2011. The outcome of Mubarak's disposition is that there was only one properly managed institution and that is military and by this military took responsibility to maintain the state institution and preserving the state-society relation. After Mubarak, the military revisited its strategies; meanwhile huge protests started threatening the foundations of state. The supreme council of Armed Forces soon realized essence for a partner and Muslim Brotherhood (A Egyptian Political Party: The Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Part) stepped in this matter. The new ruling troika was formed between the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, Police and brotherhood party. The Brotherhood party won many of the seats in the elections of 2012 while military maintained its institutional interest.

³⁴ Transparency International UK, *Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index 2013–2014* (London: Transparency International UK, 2013).

The SCAF performance was not effective, especially during 18th months which enabled brotherhood party to drive for Presidency. This decreased the power of SCAF. But Morsi also allowed the military to step back to stability mode and again focus on their institutional interests. In the end of 2012 protests were strongly shaking the troika. Although there was lot of stuff for threat for stability, SCAF offered arbitrate between many political groups. Muslim Brotherhood party introduced an Islamist alliance in parliament and appointed Mohammad Ibrahim as interior minister and relied on police to silence protest. Due to this, many protests provoked within the interior ministry which later on led towards nationwide strikes in the beginning of 2013.³⁵

Despite growing political violence and national security challenges to the country, police strikes were a major threat to state stability. Meanwhile SCAF was almost facing a crisis. While brotherhood party made no serious efforts for political settlement which brought more violence and thus deteriorated the situation to a point where massive protest started on 30 June 2013 and finally military intervened and deposed Morsi on 3 July 2013 consequently ending the political restoration. The rumors about brotherhood party about linking with terrorist organizations and major changes within SCAF split more protests in country. The state of Egypt was in great trouble because of internal protests as well as international pressure. In this situation SCAF provided "Institutional Support" to powerful El-Sisi in the presidential election. Within the wide context of transition process, no single event can capture the problem of civil military relations in Egypt. The temporary military's setbacks cannot be ruled out. The passing of revolutionary moment and radical reforms were not expected. The political, institutional and socio-economic deficit that provoked revolution in the beginning still continues. This was major cause behind the military comeback following Morsi's fall. In short military can easily overcome all the problems and threats to state.

There are two reasons of vitalization of Nasser like regime. The first one is Nasser has inherited many things from British occupation but the current state is highly incompetent fragmented and largely weak. Second one is Nasser had sufficient resources to build a strong political constituency but these types of resources are not available for current government. Recent government uses conservative policies to achieve its institutional interests. The lack of the resources will be a cause of deprivation of political support of different classes e.g. professional middle class and the poor bourgeoisie. This kind of conflict shows that for the survival of Egypt a strong capable government is preferred which would work for deep institutional and political reforms. A mistake to understand these problems could push Egypt towards turmoil. The military's old approach of conservative principles may provoke the re-emergence of protests and strikes. The banned brotherhood party never re-gain its popularity and from now more dependency lies on military. There are lots of chances of entire collapse of state which is more destructive. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces needs to act in a very wise manner to overcome the situation. On the other hand it needs to sustain support for

³⁵ Ibrahim El Houdaiby, *Fighting the Last War? Civil-Military Relations in Egypt* (Madrid: FRIDE and Hivos, 2014), 87.

state institution to prevent from destruction. While it also needs to organize all the institutions in the country especially the new ones and push them for a better change.

In elections El-Sisi won presidential election which could be milestone for civil military relations in a sense that he will have unmatched opportunities to reform state institution. He has two main advantages:

- A strong popular mandate that would be favourable for him than any other network including the military.
- A long military history that gives him sufficient understanding of how it functions.

Combining these two he would stand in a good manner for a meaningful change. But expecting these changes in short term is very optimistic. Forty years of military rule leaves a scope for anything and with an encourage of status quo advocates that one should not expect El-Sisi to impetus for change. In fact the “remilitarisation” of state should be expected in his regime.

Civil Military Relations in Turkey:

Türkiye is one of those countries where complexities of civil military relations are still present even after many years of successful democratic transition. The nature of civil-military relations in Türkiye is very complex because of contentious transitions. Since 1923 the country faces four military coups having different degrees of intervention where military performed a full-blown overthrow of the civilian government and took temporary rule in 1960s and 1980s and use subtle means in 1971 and 1997. Since 1960 with the first intervention military becomes a most important actor of Turkish politics.³⁶ The Turkish military consider itself as a guardian of state’s domestic stability as well as guardian of Kemalism (Kemalism refers to the thoughts of Mustafa Kamal Atatürk which consisted of Secularism, Republicanism, Revolutionism, Statism and Populism) and finally military consider itself as symbol of the soul of Turkish nation³⁷ and also views as a good institution for Turkish nation. Scholars hold that civil-military relations are best when civilian preferences prevail and the scene is totally changed when military preferences dominate over civilian preferences.³⁸ On this account Civil-military relations in Türkiye usually dominated by military preferences which have been problematic throughout the history. Actually, a tutelary role is played by Turkish military in political and democratic development.³⁹

Throughout the last decade a significant balance emerged between Turkish civil-military relations because of many significant political events e.g. commencement of Ergenekon trials in 2008. This Turkish scenario would consider as tutelary era to post-tutelary

³⁶ Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 88.

³⁷ Gareth Jenkins, "Continuity and Changes: Prospects of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *International Affairs* 79, no. 2 (2003): 112–120.

³⁸ Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 189.

³⁹ Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, 88.

era.⁴⁰ Tutelary power means that a broad oversight of the government and its policies while holding that it represents ambiguous basic interests of the nation.⁴¹

In 1928, Turkish constitution was drafted by the military and remained completely active till the referendum of 2010. Much of constitution was related to national solidarity and remaining depends upon ideology of Kemal which was fully regarded by Turkish military.⁴² Many institutions were dominated by the military to accomplish the national solidarity. A council was formed according to the constitution of 1961 which called National Security Council headed by President. This Council was created to assist the ministers in policy decisions and coordinating with the national security; this is broadly defined as "the protection of the constitutional order of the state, its national existence." The powers of this council were additionally increased after the amendments of 1971 and 1982.⁴³

There are many ways in which Turkish military grant itself more power as it cogitates as a guarantor of law and constitution. According to the Turkish constitution the duty of Armed forces is to protect and preserve the homeland and this confers supremacy to armed forces to overthrow any elected government. The laws which are formulated by the military are never challengeable even after the transition of democracy. This clause of the constitution makes the military more authoritative. The government of Türkiye which was elected in 2002 was more powerful than armed forces. Throughout last few years a new scenario was established in Türkiye when two Generals went on trial for overthrow of the civilian governments (Turkey's Former Coup Leader Stand Trial for the very first time, Hundreds of protests in country 4 April 2012). The trial is because of a meaningful referendum which causes an effective amendment in the constitution. The change in the constitution is the basis behind the decline of the power of Turkish military. In 2011 four focal military Generals resigned which reveals a major decay of the military e.g. Isik kosaner. Thus, first time civilian preferences are dominating over military preferences that are momentous occurrence for the Turkish state and for Turkish Civil-Military Relations.

Michael C Desch clearly writes in his book that civilian control of the military is shaped by structural factors such as internal and external threats. According to him, a state which faces huge external threats instead of internal threat is acceptable to have powerful civilian control over the military and in this situation an effective form of civil-military relations developed.⁴⁴ A contrary situation to this may be where internal threat is high, which may cause problematic civil-military relations. According to Desch's point of view Türkiye faces low external threat since its founding.

⁴⁰ Fuat Keyman, "Post-Vesayet: Sivilleşme ve Demokratikleşme" (2012).

⁴¹ J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 152.

⁴² Ibid., 190.

⁴³ Özbudun, 2000, 122.

⁴⁴ Desch, 1999, 55.

Türkiyeremained neutral in World War II and soon after Korean War Türkiyebecomes UN member. Although it gained NATO membership after involvement in the Korean War, it never faced enormous external threats. It never faced external threats due to its involvement in international affairs; mostly part of coalitions through NATO or UN (World fact book: Central Intelligence agency). Meanwhile Türkiyehas had high internal threat because of multi-party politics which worsened the civil-military relations. The two main internal threats to Türkiye which paves the way for military intervention remained always:

- (1) Threat to Territorial Integrity
- (2) Threat to the Secular regime

These two internal threats legitimize military intervention by a strong stance because national solidarity is much more important than anything else. In this way every coup d'état has been justified either in an open or in a closed manner. These types of threats are present even today perhaps with stronger stance than ever before. For the first time in the history of Türkiyea political party named as Justice and development party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Turkish) maintained to win elections for three terms and this party also has its roots with political Islam. Much of the reforms of this party based upon Islamic ideology even the party has sidelined the ideology of Kemal Atatürk as well as military. The Turkish military remained concerned about the regime of this party. The military even considers this party as a threat to national solidarity and secularism. According to Desch's Turkish civilian control over military are weak and civil-military relations are poor because of high internal threat rather than external. These rapid and drastic changes show that Türkiyeis an interesting case study in terms of its civil-military relations and Desch's claim shows that internal instability leads towards worse civil-military relations.

Conclusion:

There are two main problems to be addressed to gain better civil-military relations.

- Flourishing and managing the ways for different actors of the state to fill the gap.
- To ensure a smooth transformation like open heart surgery.

The First strategy is similar with fire-fighting the state should focus on maintaining existing margin of civilian space. In this case the country should observe the need to build democratic institutions and put some measures for rule of law and human rights. These types of interests are only assessable through strengthening civil society organizations. The second strategy is to focus on the strength of the state institutions. The dependency on military decreased by only this strategy; when state's institutions are strong and capable by every kind then supremacy of military decreased. The third strategy is to empower civilian government by constitutional amendments. Through this, there would be more chances for civil supremacy, and this will push the military back to barracks. The process of reconciliation and justice will help in stability of the civil government in the state. The Civil-Military relations only enhance in the atmosphere of trust; institutional interest can ensure stability in the country.