Making Sense of Cyber-Caliphate: A Transnational Movement in an era of hyper-globalization

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Abstract

In the age of hyper-globalization, the processes of globalization may assist transnational Islamic fundamentalist networks in creating a parallel caliphate as a *de facto* state and the cyber world (a *cyber caliphate*). The idea of caliphate is appealing as a political system to many within Muslim societies. The study shows how these fundamentalists are urban opportunists, who become participants of globalization to create a new transnational social geography or imagined worlds by using technological innovations. These technological innovations are major tool for recruitment of transnational members to create this imagined world referred as cyber-caliphate. However, the discussion shows that the nation-states take these transnational acts as threats to their national integrity and do not accord them legitimacy. In a multi-centric world, states rely on multilateral cooperation to create pluralistic spheres of authority to mitigate this transnational security challenge to the post-Westphalian state system.

Keywords: Globalization, Transnational Networks, Cyber-Caliphate, Imagined Worlds

Introduction:

Late 20th century is considered to be the beginning of the hyper-globalization, which was facilitated by the technological advancement and cyber networking. Physical and social boundaries started to reshape by creating various networks of new social spaces beyond the traditional political demarcations. The new social spaces as a trans-national reality emerged with phenomenon like imagined worlds through a respatialization process of the globalized world. Cyber-Caliphate is one of appropriate example of these imagined worlds, which demands frontierlessness of traditional boundaries of the existing international state system.

The effects of recapitalization can be sensed by observing the transition patterns in traditional state boundaries, which are becoming porous resulting in new challenges to the state system. Subsequently, non-traditional security challenges emanate from both at inter-state and intra-state level becoming a great source of concern in contemporary international relations. To point out a few examples, the attacks on New York and Washington DC (2001), Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), Jakarta (2004/2009) and London (2005) are vivid examples of non-traditional security challenges of transnational world.[1] Hence, the globalization of world politics outlines a new script for the 21st century that predominantly reflects the image of a transnational, yet a complex interdependent world.

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[1] Kai Hafez, *Radicalism and Political Reform in the Islamic and Western Worlds*, trans. Alex Skinner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 190.

The complexity of this transnational world can be observed through witnessing that societies at large become "less cohesive and boundaries increasingly porous; vast number of new actors are crowding the world stage; money moves instantaneously along the information highway and that ideas swirl instantaneously in cyberspaces; the ripple effects of horrific terrorist actions seem endless; the feedback loops generated by societal breakdowns, proliferating actors, and boundary-spanning information are greatly intensifying the complexity of life.[2] Subsequently, owing to cyber networking the intensity, extensity and acceleration of interconnectedness has risen on one hand, while on the other side, the cyberspace facilitates in creation of social geographies at virtual scale to many transnational actors becoming realities.

Post 9/11 script of global political theatre vividly explains that terrorism turned to be a great menace for world peace and stability. Many scholarships like Thomas Friedman's (2007) work "The World is Flat" would advocate that transnational terrorists desire to undo the progress facilitated by globalization. As Friedman would call them, the "most dangerous unflattening forces today", these fundamentalists are referred to as anti-globalization actors.[3] In contrast, the Islamic fundamentalists are not actually anti-globalization; rather their role is as "parts, participants, and interpreters of globalization."[4] Many of fundamentalists take it seriously that Western socio-economic and political norms and values threaten the very existence of socio-cultural and religious values, and to counter the influx of information and patterns of global interactions, fundamentalists do participate to create their own spatial existence.

What happens is that the advancements in technologies as forces of globalization, which are primarily linked with secular Cosmo-politics, turn out to be an opportunity for fundamentalists to employ purposefully their politico-theologies that helps to create nexus between targeted local and global audience (Benjamin Bratton, 2009). For instance, the rise of Al-Qaeda embraced the technological tools and utilized the processes of globalization to achieve its fundamental organizational objectives. Without being opportunists and embracing the processes of globalization, global objectives like creation of caliphate[5] for most of transnational Islamist organizations may not be possible. In fact, the global recognition or identity of Islamist leadership was also linked with sophistication and modernization of organizational structure, which clearly vindicates the notion that "Osama bin Laden is the quintessential product of the 1990's and globalism, (a) terrorism CEO (that) could not have existed— and thrived—in any other era."[6]

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[2] James N. Rosenau, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 211.

[3] Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Picador/ Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 555.

[4] Asep Muhamad Iqbal and Zulkifli, "Islamic fundamentalism, nation-state and global citizenship: the case
of Hizb ut-Tahrir," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 6, no.1 (2016), 38.

[5] Caliphate (Arabic. Khilafaht) is an Islamic political system and the Caliph (Arabic. Khalifah) meaning vicar or successor, who administers the Islamic political system. Hazrat Aboubekr, who was father in law and first successor of this title after the death of Prophet Mohammed in 632 A.D.

[6] Shawn Brimley, "Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks," *Parameters: U.S. Army War College* 36, no. 2 (2006), 33.

The transnational Islamist organizations like Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, ISIS and others want to have a "transnational presence, and its vision of global Muslim community."[7] Creation of this imagined community remains highly dependent on technical skilled human force that further recruit members from all over world relying upon cyber network, ultimately paving a way to establish a "global citizenship" for its members.[8] The modernization of transnational Islamist groups can be judged by their efficiency to engage its target groups through the use of both electronic and print media i.e. newspapers, FM radio stations, TV programs, internet based video channels, blogs, social media and internet based recruitment of its potential members.

Interestingly, Scott Helfstein (2012) explains that there are four motivational profiles among the members of these Islamist organizations, namely revenge seekers, thrill seekers, identity seekers and status seekers. According to Helfstein, the "revenge seekers and thrill seekers are fairly straightforward, [while], the identity seekers look to build a sense of self that is tied to their group participation, and status seekers desire recognition for their action."[9] Eventually, those who hold leadership status strive to establish a global Caliphate through the cyber world to control the global members of their organization(s), which seems to be "a cosmogram, like other large and small official and unofficial systems of governable space."[10]

It is true that cybernetics has changed fundamentalists' ways of planning and operating, today the objective to establish caliphate using technological advancement is best suited source for them. Seeking to establish caliphate is not a new phenomenon, rather historical old practice to establish Islamic political system through adopting Islamic Sahria law as a guiding principle remained in place. Many Islamic scholarships have reiterated and advocated for Islamic political system as more just and consultative democratic process to look after the socio-political and economic affairs of society. Islamic scholars like Abul A'la Maududi agreed that Islamic political system is primarily based on "three principles, namely i) principles: Tawhid (unity of God/ Allah), Risalat (Prophethood) and Khilafat (Viceregency)."[11] Getting inspiration on these religious explanations, today the ultimate goal of all Islamist fundamental organizations desire to have a transnational caliphate, and in an era of globalization the possible outcome to achieve the very objective is in the shape of virtual or cyber-caliphate. Arjun Appudarai has extended Benedict Anderson's notion of 'imagined community' with a new phenomenon called "imagined worlds, [which is] the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe."[12]

To create these imagined worlds, the contributing factors that change the landscape of human societies can be understood through five dimensions of global

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[7] Asep Muhamad Iqbal and Zulkifli, "Islamic fundamentalism, nation-state and global citizenship: the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir," 38.

[8] ibid, 38.

[9] Scott Helfstein, "Edges of Radicalization: Individuals, Networks and Ideas in Violent Extremism," *The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,* (2012), 14.

[10] Benjamin H. Bratton, "On Geoscapes and the Google Caliphate Reflections on the Mumbai Attacks," *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 no. 7/8 (2009), 333.

[11] Vernie Liebl, "The Caliphate," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45 no. 3 (2009), 373

[12] Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minnesota: Public Worlds/ University of Minesota Press, 2005), 33.

cultural flows, i.e. (i) ethnoscapes, (ii) mediascapes, (iii) technoscapes, (iv) financescapes, and (v) ideoscapes.[13] As these scapes contribute in reconfiguration of our social geographies and alter the landscapes of human societies, Benjamin Bratton (2009) adds another term to the exist list referred to as the geoscape(s). According to Bratton's account geoscape "is a shifting landscape comprised of shifting landscapes, image-maps, projections and plans, irredentist land claims, borders and jurisdictions, strata and striations, imagined worlds, projected homes and homelands, addressing systems, and various terra incognita."[14]

Specifically, the mediascapes and ideoscapes enable not only traditional state actors but also the transnational groups to create, produce and disseminate images and ideologies to propagate any information or counter conflicting image or information. For instance, the very notion of jihad itself that is re-interpreted and disseminated by religious fundamentalists organizations across the world, in order to achieve their organizational core objectives. Furthermore, the re-interpretation of conceptual framework of jihad becomes the order of day as a guiding principle for Islamic fundamentalists. The fundamentalist organizations not only become global, but also utilize and gather support networks that are best characterized by their mobility, flexibility, and fluidity that paves a way to assimilate in global system. The payoff for assimilating in global structures create operational benefits, and it also changes the strategic environment in ways amenable to transnational groups.

Events in post-9/11 period would illustrate that today's Islamists follow the interpretation of jihad in globalized format, which turned to be a violent struggle against *"the lands of the unbelievers, the dar al-harb or House of War, with the dar al-islam or House of Islam"* under Islamic Sharia.[15] Interestingly, it is keenly observed that the technologically advance societies are on priority agenda of fundamentalists to engage its population via cyberspace, because the *"virtual world of the potential cybercaliphate knows no conventional boundaries*."[16]

Research question:

Referring to the above discussion, it foretells that we live in a time of complexity and one of existing global challenges are referred modern Jihad carried out by Islamist organizations i.e.. ISIS, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates [Affiliates can be individuals or radical jihadi organizations, which have direct or indirect connection with Al-Qaeda or sympathies for Osama bin Laden. E.g. "Abu Bakar Ba asyir, the spiritual leader of jihadi organization possible suspected in the Bali (Indonesia) bombings (the council of Indonesian Jihad fighters, a group ties with Jemaah Islamiyah and possibly al-Qaeeda) has expressed strong support for Bin Laden and the attacks on United States"].[17] The era of globalization facilitates these organizations, directly or indirectly, in many ways giving rise to a number of questions. This paper tries to seek the notion behind how jihad

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[13] ibid, 33

[14] Benjamin H. Bratton, "On Geoscapes and the Google Caliphate Reflections on the Mumbai Attacks," *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 no. 7/8 (2009), 333.

[15] Christopher J. van der Krogt, "Jihād without apologetics," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 21, no. 2 (2010), 128.

[16] David Martin Jones and M. L. R. Smith, "Greetings from the cybercaliphate: some notes on homeland insecurity," *International Affairs* 81 no. 5 (2005), 942.

[17] Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson, *New Media in the Muslim World: The emerging Public Sphere* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 174.

becomes a transnational course of action? What are the factors making this concept global? How it affects global society? And what is the core agenda of modern Jihad?

The above-framed questions are key issues areas that are connected to the contemporary global issues pertinent to world's peace and stability at different levels and dimensions. Academicians, policy makers and security strategist are continuously framing certain strategies to encounter these challenges both at inter-state and intra-state level. The urgency of time is an important factor in the period of hyper-globalization, because, if finding resolve is too late or get delayed then ramifications are equally high in such a fast paced technologically advanced and cyber dominated intertwined world.

The rationale behind framing these questions is to seek answers from a non-traditional perspective. The explanation part of this paper discusses the difference between jihad during classic and modern Islamic period. As, our focused time period is late 20th century and more specifically events after 9/11, so the concept of jihad used in modern times is under discussion. Finally, the discussion of paper finds the agenda of modern jihad and ways that globalization and its forces become useful agents for fundamentalist to achieve their local and global agendas not only to create its global imagine but to create space for its followers to operate transnationally.

Conceptualizing Jihad in Classic and Modern Islamic Period:

Jihad is considered to be one of the fundamental pillars of Islam. Though it does not come under the first five core fundamental pillars, nevertheless, some Islamic literature stresses over the concept of Jihad both in theory and its practice as a central theme to be focused on. In classical Islam, Jihad was employed for self-purification or piety as being abstained from any harmful act that may cause problem to others or deteriorate self-moral values. In contrast, the given condition for military jihad was allowed for self-defense or in case any peaceful Muslim society comes under oppression of an aggressor. Still, the military jihad was not given leverage over bigger jihad. In classical Islamic traditions, the '*Jihad-e-Akbar* or bigger jihad' was mainly referred to jihad as intellectual struggle to employ rational thoughts to explore world and understand the hidden mysteries of universe, in a sense, refers for academic research and discoveries or inventions. On the other hand, preparations and participation for defense against an armed conflict in consequence of foreign aggression has been known as "*Qitaal* or *Jihad-e-Asghar.*"[18]

If we navigate the Islamic history and epochs of Muslim societies, they prove to be full of military adventures, while primary source of legitimization of these adventures are based on spreading the word of God to the non-Muslim regions; same as in primordial times the Greeks once justified the military epochs of Alexander the Great. This, in a sense, vindicates that over the period of time Muslim societies gradually provided a greater space or leverage for little jihad and undermines the intellectual or knowledge orientations of non-violent jihad. Muslim societies established a number of Caliphates after the death of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) through the means of jihad. For instance, Khulfa-e-Rashideen the first Caliphate system, the Omayyad's, the Abbasid, the Fatimid, and the Ottoman Caliphates are prominent examples of caliphate system spread throughout Islamic history, and even many of hereditary monarchies also claimed to continue their rule as Caliphate. The historiography of various caliphate

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[18] Manzar Zaidi, "A Taxonomy of Jihad," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 31 no.3 (2009), 24.

systems, more or less, employed distinct means of jihad to establish Islamic political systems in Africa, Asia and Europe.

In modern Islamic period, since Muslim world does not have any Caliphate, however creating a caliphate, which is a Islamic political system remained desirable to many of Muslim societies. Contemporary Islamic jihad is highly influenced by Sayyid Qutb's thoughts. Qutb found a socio-political vacuum or something missing in Muslim world, which he believed was imperative to be filled. Qutb felt that without unifying the Muslim Ummah (Muslims of the world) under a viable Caliphate, it would be hard for contemporary Muslims to revive their glorious past and to counter a systematic otherization of Muslims across their respective regions. The greatest challenge to unify in this regard was, firstly, the very existence of a political system based on nation-states, and secondly, Muslim societies themselves became heterogeneous not only on cultural, historical, ethnic and linguistic grounds, but the political structure of Muslim world also modified over the period of time. Qutb and his followers (Bin Laden) tried to achieve a global Caliphate through 'jihad bil saif' or 'struggle with sword'. Sayyid Qutb in his work 'Milestone', provides reasons to legitimize jihad that it is a way….

"*to establish God's authority in the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others since all men are creatures of God and no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws for them. These reasons are sufficient for proclaiming Jihad.*"[19]

At this point, it is significantly important to understand multiple meanings of jihad. Usually jihad has been projected with a negative connotation in the period of globalization. The problem lies not with the phenomena of jihad itself, but rather the image and practice of jihad is linked with its interpretation and perception created worldwide. Generally, the recent decade shows that, globally jihad is perceived as terrorism. Shaping of this global perception is crafted by media vis-à-vis the individuals who projected a violent interpretation of jihad predominantly. Even the scripture in Holy Quran predicts about certain individuals or group in a society, who will misquote Qur'an for their personal gains. Quoting verses from the Holy Qur'an that says that:

"*…there is among them a section who distorts the Book with their tongues [language]: (as they read) you would think it is a part of the Book, but it is no part of the Book; and they say, 'That is from Allah', but it is not from Allah. It is they who tell a lie against Allah, and (well) they know it!*"[20]

However, the interpretation finally depends on the prevailing socio-political conditions of Muslim world vis-à-vis the cultural variation amongst Muslim societies and also due to different interpretations of faith that are situated in multi-stranded religious traditions as well. In classic Islamic traditions or in a historical context, the domestic military actions were called *maghazı* (raids or expeditions) for defense. However, we can see in the time after the life of Prophet Muhammad, (PBUH) Muslims embarked on "*subsequent conquests beyond the Arabian Peninsula as futuh: literally the opening' of*

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[19] Devin R. Springer, James L. Regins and David N. Edger, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 17.

[20] Major John Read, "Charting a Course through Radical Islam: Origins, Rise, Transformation and Prospects," *Defence Studies* 9 no. 2 (2009), 269,

the lands to the Arabs and their religion. Later Muslim scholars specializing in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) favoured yet another word, jihad, as a technical term for such warfare against unbelievers"[21]. These *futuh* (external / recent years global) were justified to spread the message of God, however, critique finds it as an expansion of power and territorial influence over others. This expansion was declared *qital* 'armed jihad' against the land of unbelievers, the 'dar al-harb or house of war for the dar al-Islam or house of Islam'.[22]

Jihad Become Transnational: Causes and Outcome:

History of transnational jihad could be linked back to early days of Muslims military adventures out of their territorial spaces, referred above as *futuh* (plural. Fatuhat). The 20th century is important in terms of jihad becoming transnational; particularly the turning point was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which pulled thousands of jihadists from different parts of the world to participate in this war as mujahidin. Contemporary radical Islamist leader of Al-Qaeda, Zawahri, writes in his memoir, 'knights under the Prophet's banner' commends the young Islamic jihadists who defeated the mighty superpower on earth. [23]

However, early 20th century is an important period for radical Islamists because of the fall of last Muslim Caliphate Ottoman Empire, dissolved by Mustefa Kemal Attaturk. Significantly, soon after Ottoman's the teaching of Hassan al Banna, a local schoolteacher initiated a new movement in Egypt called Al-ikhwan ul Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood). This movement flourished into further orthodox missionary up-shoots, although in "Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood continues to operate as a totalitarian movement, and it is not merely the advocate of an Islam without Fear."[24] The Muslim brotherhood had a drastic impact on other neighboring Muslim societies.

The central role in contemporary transnational Islamists influence can be attributed to the teachings and writings of Sayyid Qutb. Qutb asserted in his writings that the entire world including Muslims are living in jahiliyah (ignorance); only by practicing Islam and carrying out jihad against nonbelievers can bring the Muslims out of jahiliyah and Muslim "ummah be set on right course."[25] It is visible that Qutb kept instigating fellow Muslims to declare "jihad against jahili (ignorant/ unbelievers) targets."[26] Qutb knew that the heterogeneity of civilizations is a reality of the world and it was hard to homogenize everyone with his radical monolithic ideas. Yet, he cleverly used his radical thoughts in order to be accepted at popular scale by Muslim world, which shows a process of "universalization of values", these values were based on emotions that are filled with animosity and revenge against other fellow beings.[27]

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[21] Christopher J. van der Krogt, "Jihād without apologetics," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 21 no.2 (2010), 128.

[22] ibid, 128.

[23] Fawaz A Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 84.

[24] Bassam Tibi, "The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam," *Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions* 8 no.1 (2007), 39.

[25] Devin R. Springer, James L. Regins and David N. Edger, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 11.

[26] ibid,11.

[27] Bassam Tibi, "The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam," *Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions* 8 no.1 (2007), 42.

Sayyid Qutb was prisoned for plotting against the then Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and during his imprisonment he produced two important books the '*Social Justice* and Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones). In addition, he also wrote his masterpiece Fi Zilal al-Qur'an (In the shade of the Qur'an) during the same time. Both of these books with several volumes become a source of guidance and motivation for radical Islamists, particularly for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda affiliates. Qutb was executed for his radical claims and plots against state authority. The legacies of Qutb's thinking did not stay confined to Egypt; rather it travelled to other countries both in the Middle East and outside. In addition, other vivid examples of Islamic movements during Cold war era would be Maulana Mawdudi's struggle in the Indian sub-continent; while in 1979 Iran's Islamic revolution succeeded to supplant socio-political structure under Ruhollah Khomeini.

The year 1979 is very crucial in the history of contemporary global jihad or transnational terrorism. The technological advancement was already on its accelerating pace of development; however, Soviet invasion to Afghanistan gave a chance to Osama bin laden to practically implement the teachings and written guidance of his mentor, Sayyid Qutb. After the end of the Afghan war, Osama and his al-Qaeda organization started to reconnect with his old comrades of Afghan war. He re-organized his organization and asked help from al-Zawahiri to join his global struggle.[28] Al-Zawahiri's inclusion to global jihad furthered the transnational character of this movement, as they start infiltrating into Central Asian region, Middle East, Africa and South Asia with low scale connections in Europe and America as well.

In 1998, the al-Quds al-Arabi published a fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda against the United States.[29] The excerpt of the fatwa given below depicts how Osama indoctrinated into his followers the hatred against non-believers specifically dwelling in West. A few years after this fatwa was issued, the entire world was shocked by the al-Qaeda attacks on the twin towers in New York.

"The ruling to kill the Americans and their – civilians and military – is an individual duty of every Muslim who do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosques from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together, and fight them until there is no more tumult or opposition, and there prevails justice and faith in God."[30]

The very fundamental issue of this transnational struggle is a vagueness of any clear objective. The goals and objectives remain keeps changing or overlap between core objectives and operational patterns, i.e. some times the fundamentalists seek the withdrawal of US and allied forces from Middle East, or sometimes they propose an

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[28] Fawaz A Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 119.
[29] Fatwa is a religious opinion issued by an Islamic scholar defining under Islamic jurisprudence, these opinions may be about distinct aspects of life including individual life, social norms, religion, war, peace, jihad, and politics.
[30] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The New Global Threat: transnational Salafis and Jihad," *Middle East Policy* 8 no. 4 (2001), 18.

Islamic Caliphate, and also at other times they fight against Muslims who don't support them or have differences of opinion with them.

A. Globalization a Facilitating Factor:

In the discussion above, which provides a base to outline the historical developments that how the conceptual framework of jihad is connected to distinct contextual and geographical realities. And the current high tides of waves of globalization is dominating factor that further creates an enabling space for fundamentalists to spread the notion of jihad to create a transnational political system.

i) Jihadism: a Roadmap for Establishing a Cyber-Caliphate:

The jihad doctrine is always remained under practice, but in different shapes that include non-violent and violent ways depending on the times and epoch. As referred earlier, the modern era jihad has gathered momentum since Afghan war against former Soviet Union. During the Afghan war all jihadi mujahidin were invited to liberate their Muslim brothers from foreign invaders. So the Afghan war not only helped Salafi jihadists to develop transnational linkages, it also changed the 'classical Muslim debates on warfare [that] had predominantly focused on jus in bello (legitimate mean in warfare) rather than jus ad bellum (grounds for warfare)' becoming a tool to justify war against others in the name of religion via transnational jihad.[31] Hence, the Salafi ideology becomes "activating agent" for entire modern jihad episode.[32]

Even though the war or jihad against Soviet Union was over, and the post 1990's era the rise of Taliban (local Islamist movement) and Al-Qaeda (a transnational movement) decided to retain as an obligation the burden to defend Muslims globally, whether in Bosnia, Kashmir, Philippine, or anywhere in the world, including the Middle East. They launched a 'nomadic jihad'.[33] Interestingly these nomadic jihadists tactfully become sophisticated with technological advancement and start deliberating over 'World Islamic Order'. As Tibi describes it for the "*jihadist Islamism the umma is reconfigured to become what Benedict Andersen calls an 'imagined community' fighting jihad for an Islamic world order".*[34]

Gradually, the Salafi movement under al-Qaeda directives followed transnational efforts for religious purifications and formed connections with ideologically like-minded groups. It helped these radical Salafists to develop a wider network as a transnational 'imagined community' and rationalize their congruent interest and similar approach of Islam and its interpretation.[35] For instance, in 2004 when US forces arrested the leader of Jamaat Ahl Jaysh al-Sunnah wal Jamaa Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (later become Caliph Ibrahim and led ISIS) at Fallujah and kept at Camp Bucca, during the time he and other Islamists like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi the leader of Bayat al Imam and

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[31] ibid, 22.

[32] Tawfik Hamid, *Inside Jihand: Understanding and Confronting radical Islam* (Self Published Book, 2008), 74.

[33] Quintan Wiktorowicz. "The New Global Threat: transnational Salafis and Jihad." Middle East Policy 8.4 (2001), 18-38, 24.

[34] Bassam Tibi. "The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam." Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions 8.1 (2007), 35-54, 38 .

[35] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The New Global Threat: transnational Salafis and Jihad," *Middle East Policy* 8 no. 4 (2001), 20.

the Jama'at al-Tawid wa-al-Jihad expressed their allegiance to Emir Osama Bin Laden.[36] The beginning of transnational network amongst Islamist groups framed global agenda of establishing Caliphate in later years and interpreted classic Islamic thoughts as a valuable tool for garnering support. Furthermore, al-Qaeda and its affiliates exaggerated heroism of jihad that helped them to win support and recruits from backward and relatively ignorant parts of world. According to Krogt (2010), preaching the concept of "jihad and martyrdom to justify suicide bombing provides a powerful incentive: the prospect of being a glorified hero in this life and enjoying Paradise in the next' and giving legitimacy of suicide bombing and the killing of innocents."[37] In contrast, the original teachings and practices of Islam does not tolerate the killings of innocents, damage to the property and forceful act against the will of any innocent rather all human life is sacred in Islam. Quran clearly gives a message in the Surah Al-Ma'idah (5:32) that "whoever kills an innocent soul … it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely."

ii) Fluidity of Borders:

Fluidity of borders is one of the challenges posed by globalization to traditional political demarcations of nation states. Here fluidity of borders is discussed in three dimensions. First, initially the transnational Islamist movement moved across the world through the cyber world without any severe set back. Second, militant jihadists are operating in certain ungoverned spaces, which are loosely controlled by state authority, e.g. border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan; Central Asian terrain and some places in Africa, which jihadists use as physical hide outs. Third, use of technology and sophisticated communication devises to achieve transnational targets also undermines conventional territorial security dynamics, as al-Qaeda hijackers used planes against civilian targets in New York City, which was a unique method of attack.

Looking at transnational fundamental groups, they can be categorized into three major categorizations: 1) Islamic Political Movements (radical and political oriented) 2) Islamic Mission (radical but non-violent) 3) Islamic Armed Struggle (Jihadists). The final category, Jihadists, can be further divided in to three sub-groups: i) internal (Taliban in Afghanistan) ii) irredentist (Palestinian Hamas) iii) global jihadists (Al-Qaeda).[38] If we look at missionary or political Islamists, they widely use media and technological devices to communicate freely with the masses, as armed and militant jihadists remain under the watch list of surveillance agencies, they are always careful while engaging with technology and tactical skills.

The militant or global jihadists have substantively lost their popularity and support, as they systematically target their own Muslim populations who resist or oppose them.. Global jihadists do not care about collateral damage. Irredentists are comparatively popular among their population in contrast to global jihadists. However, both kinds of jihadists use suicide bombing, hijacking, etc. against their targets to achieve their goals and objectives.[39]

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[36] Luis Tome, "The Islamic State: Trajectory and Reach a Year after its Self-Proclamation as a Caliphate," *e-journal of International Relations* 6 no. 1 (2015), 117.

[37] Christopher J. van der Krogt, "Jihād without apologetics," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 21 no.2 (2010), 138.

[38] Kai Hafez, *Radicalism and Political Reform in the Islamic and Western Worlds*, trans. Alex Skinner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 192-193.

[39] ibid, 194.

iii) Technological Growth:

Globalization has a stronger relation with technological advancement and in true sense, its technological development that has compressed time and space. Globalization has facilitated human society's development, brought distinct cultures together and improved standards of living and quality of life. Simultaneously, the ills of globalization have equally posed challenges to human societies.

To contrast the episodes of technological development and its usage in transnational moment, some vivid examples can be the Iranian revolution, in which the supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini smuggled audiotapes of his speech into Iran and other Middle Eastern countries, in order to mobilize people in support of an Islamic revolution. Today, although technology has improved vastly we have still observed that Osama bin Laden used videotapes in order to disseminate his message to al-Qaeda recruits or any other form of terror act in it.[40] Many other radical Islamist groups, such as Taliban, also use the same tactics of recording videotapes of kidnapped personnel or their own speeches to communicate with the masses. Furthermore, communication technology has become a quick source of connection. As a positive sign, the rise and role of Arab TV is not a hidden secret now. During the recent Arab uprising in Egypt and other countries were given full coverage particularly by Al-Jazeera TV. In 2003, Al-Jazeera TV reached more than 45 million people every day.[41] It has now grown and expanded to other parts of the world as well. In 2014, Al-Jazeera English reached 4 million viewers outside the Arab world.

There are scores of media channels, like Peace TV and many others, which support the idea of mediascapes that has changed the socio-cultural landscapes and disseminate the information as created and produced. Since 2014, when ISIS established its self-proclaimed Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the use of technology for teaching, preaching, fund raising and recruitment has become a highly effective tool. Samira al-Nasr, a mid-wife while sharing her experiences about ISIS rule relates how ISIS militants use newborns and kids of young age for disseminating organizational message targeting local, regional and global audiences. As the Washington Post (2018) shares her views in following words "the children of the "caliphate" were themselves treated as props. [Children] were central characters in Islamic State propaganda videos, which often showed children of diverse European, Asian and African backgrounds studying Islamic State teachings, or playing and training with weapons. Other videos purported to show adolescent boys executing people deemed apostates or enemies."[42]

The discussion suggests that by and large these Islamists groups have been successful as effective participants of globalization and broadened the size of the organizational network worldwide. For instance, al-Qaeda and its affiliates is believed to have around 5,000 to 20,000 members, while Islamic State has successfully recruited fighters between 35,000 to 100,000 from different countries.[43] Membership in Islamic State is ordered into three circles: an inner ring, near abroad, and far abroad. According to Tomé (2015) "an "inner ring", in addition to Iraq and Syria, comprises of Jordan, Israel,

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[40] James N. Rosenau, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 108-109.

[41] Jacqueline E. Sharkey, "The Rise of Arab TV," *American Journalism Review* 25 no.4 (2003), 26.

[42] Tamer El-Ghobashy, "Regrets of an ISIS midwife*," The Washington Post*, April 25, 2018.

[43] Luis Tome, "The Islamic State: Trajectory and Reach a Year after its Self-Proclamation as a Caliphate," 125.

Palestine and Lebanon; the "near abroad", includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and the Caucasus; while the "far abroad" circle, refers to the activities of the IS in Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific and also in cyberspace" (see the following tables).[44]

Table: Foreign Jihadists Fighting in Syria/ Iraq from Middle East in 2015

S/No	Country	Number of Jihadists
1.	Saudi Arabia	7000
2.	Tunisia	2500-5000
3.	Morocco	1500-3000
4.	Jordan	1500-2000
5.	Turkey	1000-1500
6.	Egypt	600-750
7.	Iran	50-80

Source: The Islamic State by Luís Tomé (October 2015)

Table: Foreign Jihadists Fighting in Syria/ Iraq from other Regions in 2015

S/No	Country	Number of Jihadists	S/No.	Country	Number of Jihadists
1.	France	1500	2.	Russia	1000-1500
3.	UK	750	4.	Germany	700
5.	Indonesia	520-550	6.	Belgium	400
7.	Turkmenistan	360-400	8.	Bosinia and Herzegovina	350
9.	Netherland	300	10.	China	300
11.	Kazakhstan	300	12.	Azerbaijan	100-300
13.	Denmark	250	14.	Sweden	200
15.	Albania	200	16.	Kyrgyzstan	200
17.	Tajikistan	200	18.	Philippines	200
19.	Canada	130	20.	Austria	100-150
21.	USA	100-120	22.	Australian	80-100
23.	Spain	60-100	24.	Italy	60
25.	Finland	50	26.	India	20-25
27.	Luxembourg, Greece, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Ireland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Portugal				15-20

Source: The Islamic State by Luís Tomé (October 2015)

Today cyber networking via internet and social media, citizen journalism are emerging trends that are actively used by jihadists to achieve their future objectives. Technological dynamics are viewed as core stimulants for societal developments and achievements, but the other side of the spectrum shows that technological advancement equally has helped in 'creating new social geographies', 'the fragmentation of groups', 'the threat of terrorism', 'the spread of fundamentalism', 'revival of historic animosities' as well. These dynamics has further provoked reactionary mobility across the globe,

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[44] ibid, 128.

despite the shrinking nature of geography, the global society faces complexity and a heightened sense of uncertainty for a peaceful co-existence.[45]

B.   Cyber-Caliphate: A Transnational Out-come:

As a result, stronger binding relations behind globalization and transnational jihadi movements help Islamists make their plans transnational. The restoration of Caliphate predominantly has remained a core area of motivation for most of the Islamists worldwide. Neo-orthodox ways of thinking are being employed by highly technically skilled individuals with core religious orientations. By 1990s, each jihadi organization had its own web page, and cyber world become another short cut or quickest way of communication to achieve the goal of establishing a caliphate. This process is not only to create a "global caliphate, but also a cybercaliphate, networked and organized through websites like umma.net or Azzam.com. These were run, until his arrest in 2004, by Babar Ahmed through the University of London Imperial College's computer system to create a transnational network promoting the agenda of creating a cybercaliphate'.[46]

The fundamentals to create this global caliphate were outlined by al-Qaeda in their "2020 plan."[47] The agenda of establishing Caliphate, however, would not halt the terrorist activities of the radical Islamists; rather the globalization of Islam via technological growth motivates them to preach jihad and fundamentalism via cybernetic tools. To dilate further, Fu'ad Husayn a Jordanian journalist revealed Al-Qaeda's 2020 Plan and published it in a biography in 2005. Husayn came to know about Al-Qaeda leader Al-Zarqawi and his mentor Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi in prison in Iraq.

Later on, the biography clearly identifies Al-Qaeda's 'master plan'. This plan was the result of Husayn's personal interaction and interviews with Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda's security chief Sayf al-Adil. The biography reflects a motivation of al-Qaeda and its affiliates to begin efforts and work for the establishment of a Caliphate from 2000 to 2020. This twenty-year plan is set into seven stages in order to accomplish their mission systematically. These seven stages include i) The Awakening: 2000–2003, ii) The Eye Opening: 2003–2006, iii) Reawakening and Standing Upright: 2007–2010, iv) Recuperation and Possession of Power: 2010–2013, v) Declaring an Islamic State: 2013–2016, vi) All-Out Confrontation: 2016–2020, and vii) Final Victory: 2020. These seven stages are not only to create a de facto state, but also to develop an alternate economic system to challenge existing global economic trade mechanism.

However, al-Qaeda's 2020 plan couldn't come to fruition due to a leadership vacuum. Although, at the same time some important factors contributed to the rise of the Islamic State and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its leader. Some prominent factors include the US withdrawal from Iraq, death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, Arab Spring and civil war in Iraq and Syria.[48] As a result, on 29th June 2014 ISIS established its self-proclaimed caliphate called the Islamic State, and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself

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[45] James N. Rosenau, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 209.

[46] Jones, David Martin and M. L. R. Smith, "Greetings from the cybercaliphate: some notes on homeland insecurity," *International Affairs* 81 no. 5 (2005), 940.

[47] Devin R. Springer, James L. Regins and David N. Edger, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 76-79.

[48] Luis Tome, "The Islamic State: Trajectory and Reach a Year after its Self-Proclamation as a Caliphate," *e-journal of International Relations* 6 no. 1 (2015), 117.

as Caliph Ibrahim."[49] Soon after declaring the Islamic state, the ISIS posted on the Internet a detailed message to Muslims all around the world asking them to show their allegiance and be faithful (bay'ah) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The message stated "he is the imam and khalīfah (Caliph) for the Muslims everywhere."[50]

After declaring his Caliphate, Caliph Ibrahim, in his sermon at Grand Mosque of Mosul, instructed all Muslims to follow him as "I have been appointed to rule over you ... And obey me so long as I obey God touching you. If I disobey Him, no obedience is owed from me to you."[51] Reacting to the self-proclaim Caliphate, most of the Muslim countries abstained to legitimize the claim of Caliph Ibrahim. Rather, it is observed since declaration of Caliphate in Syria and Iraq under Caliph Ibrahim a mass scale exodus of people in Iraq and Syria started into the neighboring countries, as the war was inflicted upon them.

Millions of innocent lives lost their lives under the rule of both ISIS and ruling regimes in these countries. On the dubious claim for being righteous in name of God and actions against humanity is strongly deterred in the Holy Book Quran. As the verses of Holy Quran says in Surah Al-Baqarah that "And of the people is he whose speech pleases you in worldly life, and he calls Allah to witness as to what is in his heart, yet he is the fiercest of opponents. And when he goes away, he strives throughout the land to cause corruption therein and destroy crops and animals. And Allah does not like corruption(2:204 – 2:205)."

Regardless of many of contradictions to teachings and clear messages of Quran, individuals and groups use selective script from Quran to legitimize the action even it violates the basic principles of human rights. Overall, what is witnessed now is that the Islamists have taken full advantage of the technological advancements in a globalized world to disseminate their message and recruit as many members as possible to their cause. The possibility of a seeking to create cyber caliphate (virtual world) is much quicker and easier than that of a creation of caliphate in a physical sense.

Conclusion:

Seeking to establish caliphate in not a new trend, Muslim history is full with episodes where religio-political groups attempt to create a political system based on sharia law. It is observed that political deprivations, injustice and social issues prompt the depressed groups to look for an alternate system or a political surrogate to rescue them. For example, the "racial otherization of the Muslim" in sub-continent was noticed during British Colonial rule, where Muslims of sub-continent vehemently supported the dwindling Ottomon Caliphate as a global caliph during late 19th and early 20th Century.[52] Supporting the Ottomans was a symbolic gesture that may compensate in return to rescue Muslims of sub-continent to liberty and democratic empowerment. Similarly, the transnational movements of the 21st century to establish caliphates strive to seek support from all those who feel socio-politically deprived or ignored.

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[49] ibid, 119.

[50] ibid, 122.

[51] ibid, 123.

[52] Cemil Aydin, "Imperial Paradoxes: A Caliphate for Subaltern Muslims," *ReOrie*nt 1 no. 2 (2016), 182.

Establishing Caliphate through globalization of radical Islam has posed tremendous challenges to global peace and security in recent decades. We can refer to the scenario of contemporary radical Islamic regimes in various parts of world as new totalitarianism, these are transnational movements based on a re-imagined Islamic Umma. Mark Juergensmeyer aptly refers to them as a competition between religious and secular orders underlying "the new Cold War' being fought by jihadists" to subdue the dominating secular ideological fronts.[53]

On one hand, militant global jihad is using transnational terrorism to achieve its objectives and on the other hand it uses the cyber space to disseminate audio-video images of its version of radical Islam to create a cybercaliphate, which is another dimension of modern radicalization. In case of the establishment of a caliphate by the creation of a de facto state, as witnessed in the case of the Islamic State, Arab nation-states did not offer any legitimate recognition rather it was taken as a transnational threat to their national integrity. Bratton (2009) portrays these virtual de facto states as "google geographic platforms" [which actually] instructive of what we do not know, namely how to describe and theorize this jumble of jurisdictions, and in them, what happens to states and their sovereignty when they must compete so directly for their monopoly on legitimate citizenship."[54] Playing on the vulnerabilities and sensitivities of the masses around the globe that feel suppressed, both politically and economically, may give support to terrorist organizations, yet the viability of a caliphate with a de facto state is questionable.

Therefore, the "vulnerabilities due to [transnational] terrorism are likely to continue for the foreseeable future, but terrorists cannot dominate; they can only wreak havoc."[55] To counter these transnational challenges, the Arab world, which itself is divided into regional and sectarian grouping, has allied with Western countries to tackle these threats. Use of sophisticated modern technology to counter transnational forces and freeze their financial support networks are serious steps taken so far. However, it does not mean that one should stay oblivious to future possible threats until they are completely

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[53] Bassam Tibi, "The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam," *Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions* 8 no.1 (2007), 43.

[54] Benjamin H. Bratton, "On Geoscapes and the Google Caliphate Reflections on the Mumbai Attacks," *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 no. 7/8 (2009), 340.

[55] James N. Rosenau, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 231.

whittled down to a minimal scale. The possible threats in the future may include terrorist activities "involving biological, chemical or nuclear weapons could increase the human costs dramatically" and can cause a great havoc to international peace and development.[56] The complex nature of today's "multi-centric world" needs to advocate for multilateral cooperation that engages the "pluralism of authorities" to address the transnational security challenges.[57] It is because, the global realties of modern times makes it hard to control fluidity of boundaries and communication network, which have become like a cobweb. The process of globalization has created a new and difficult topography that fundamentalists are using for greater benefit. The post-Cold War period has facilitated entire world, which includes these transnational fundamentalists, who enjoy easy access to satellite phones that increases connectivity and linkages between their subjects and targets to achieve the goals.

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[56] Kai Hafez, *Radicalism and Political Reform in the Islamic and Western Worlds,* trans. Alex Skinner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 190.
[57] James N. Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization, 281.